August 7, 2013, 9:21 am
On December 3, 2012, the US Coast Guard (USCG) published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register that recommended that owners and operators of foreign-flagged Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODUs) that have not previously operated but intend to operate on the U.S. OCS voluntarily comply with Chapter 6 of the 2009 IMO MODU Code. Additionally, we advised that the USCG was considering issuing a rule that would implement Chapter 6 of the 2009 IMO MODU Code and that would be applicable to foreign-flagged MODUs that have never operated, but intend to operate, on the U.S. OCS.
The NPRM is now available on line at: https://s3.amazonaws.com/public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2013-14951.pdf
The NPRM proposes to require 3rd-party testing & certification of electrical equipment in hazardous locations on certain vessels regardless of flag administration. The NPRM would also expand the USCG's list of acceptable national & international explosion protection standards for electrical equipment located within hazardous locations, and the proposal also adds the Certification to Standards Relating to Equipment for Use in Explosive Atmospheres (IECEx System) as an accepted method for testing & certifying electrical equipment intended for use in hazardous locations.
The proposed applicability includes:
1. NEW U.S. MODUs, floating facilities, and vessels;
2. FOREIGN MODUs, floating facilities, and vessels that have NEVER operated on the U.S. OCS; and
3. It MAY be used by existing US MODUs, floating facilities, vessels, and tank vessels.
This would update requirements currently in CG regulations from the 1989 MODU Code.
For questions, please contact Commander Chris Marcy, USCG, Office of Design & Engineering Standards, Chief, Systems Engineering Division (CG-ENG-3), Tel: (202) 372-1375, Chris.K.Marcy@uscg.mil.
August 7, 2013, 9:21 am
On December 3, 2012, the US Coast Guard (USCG) published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register that recommended that owners and operators of foreign-flagged Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODUs) that have not previously operated but intend to operate on the U.S. OCS voluntarily comply with Chapter 6 of the 2009 IMO MODU Code. Additionally, we advised that the USCG was considering issuing a rule that would implement Chapter 6 of the 2009 IMO MODU Code and that would be applicable to foreign-flagged MODUs that have never operated, but intend to operate, on the U.S. OCS.
The NPRM is now available on line at: https://s3.amazonaws.com/public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2013-14951.pdf
The NPRM proposes to require 3rd-party testing & certification of electrical equipment in hazardous locations on certain vessels regardless of flag administration. The NPRM would also expand the USCG's list of acceptable national & international explosion protection standards for electrical equipment located within hazardous locations, and the proposal also adds the Certification to Standards Relating to Equipment for Use in Explosive Atmospheres (IECEx System) as an accepted method for testing & certifying electrical equipment intended for use in hazardous locations.
The proposed applicability includes:
1. NEW U.S. MODUs, floating facilities, and vessels;
2. FOREIGN MODUs, floating facilities, and vessels that have NEVER operated on the U.S. OCS; and
3. It MAY be used by existing US MODUs, floating facilities, vessels, and tank vessels.
This would update requirements currently in CG regulations from the 1989 MODU Code.
For questions, please contact Commander Chris Marcy, USCG, Office of Design & Engineering Standards, Chief, Systems Engineering Division (CG-ENG-3), Tel: (202) 372-1375, Chris.K.Marcy@uscg.mil.
August 7, 2013, 9:19 am
COAST GUARD TERMINATION OF ITS 2 MHZ DISTRESS WATCHKEEPING SERVICE
Effective 01 August, 2013, the U. S. Coast Guard will terminate its radio guard of the international voice distress, safety and calling frequency 2182 kHz and the international digital selective calling (DSC) distress and safety frequency 2187.5 kHz. Additionally, marine information and weather broadcasts transmitted on 2670 kHz will terminate concurrently.
The Coast Guard will continue to maintain a continuous watch on VHF FM channel 16 (156.8 MHz) and on existing voice and DSC frequencies in the 4/6/8/12 MHz bands as described in the Coast Guard Navigation Center website: http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=cgcommsCall
August 7, 2013, 9:18 am
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD – MARINE SAFETY ALERT
Inspections and Compliance Directorate
June 17, 2013
Washington, DC
RECENT FAILURES OF DYNAMIC POSITIONING (DP) SYSTEMS ON
MOBILE OFFSHORE DRILLING UNITS
This Safety Alert addresses dynamic positioning incidents resulting in a loss of position on drillships.
A loss of position during a critical activity may result in a loss of well control and severe
consequences including loss of life, pollution, and property damage. Critical activities are those
activities where the consequences of equipment failure or loss of position are greater than under
normal operating circumstances. Two examples would be a MODU conducting well operations with
non-shearables through the blowout preventer (e.g., the blowout preventer's shear ram(s) cannot
shear) or when the time to terminate operations is unacceptable (e.g., the MODU crew cannot
reposition the non-shearable away from the BOP's shear ram in the time required to disconnect).
Recent incidents involving drillship loss of position and emergency disconnects have highlighted the
importance of operating a dynamically positioned drillship within its design limits, ensuring dynamic
positioning competency levels and ensuring appropriate precautions are taken during maintenance
and testing of critical equipment. A loss of position on a dynamically positioned drillship can be
mitigated by following dynamic positioning system guidance published in the ‘‘DP Operations
Guidance Prepared through the Dynamic Positioning Committee of the Marine Technology Society to
aid in the safe and effective management of DP Operations,’ March 2012 Part 2 Appendix 1
(dynamically positioned MODUs), available at:
http://www.dynamic-positioning.com/dp_operations_guidance.cfm .
See our notice in the Federal Register (77 FR 26562) available at:
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg521/docs/DP_FR_Notice_2012-10669.pdf .
In two recent incidents, dynamically positioned drillships lost functional thrusters due to an electrical
disturbance when attempting to reconnect a faulty thruster after maintenance. When the thruster was
reconnected it was not electrically isolated from other thrusters and the thrusters did not “ride through”
the disturbance causing loss of thrust. During these incidents the drillship crews were unable to
restore all functional thrusters and as a consequence these drillships lost position and had to initiate
the emergency disconnect sequence (EDS).
In another incident a dynamically positioned drillship encountered severe weather with high, shifting
winds that caused it to lose position and initiate the EDS. Despite receiving a weather alert for severe
thunderstorms and high winds well before this incident, only half of the available diesel generators
were on line when the storm hit and the DP Operator (DPO) ordered a significant heading change
with a high rate of turn when the drillship began to lose position. The drillship was unable to achieve
the ordered heading or bring all generators online before it lost position and had to initiate the EDS.
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Based on these incidents, the U.S. Coast Guard recommends that owners and operators of
dynamically positioned MODUs operating on the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf:
other key DP personnel. Training programs should maximize use of DP simulators to gain
proficiency in maintaining heading (dynamically positioned drillships) and ensuring equipment
is ready ahead of severe weather, ensuring communications with the drill floor (e.g. use of
“blue advisory”/risk assessment) and re-establishing thrust in emergency situations. (See
Marine Technology Society (MTS) MODU Operations Guidance Section 4.13 and IMCA M
117 Rev.1 Appendix 4).
Operating Guideline per MTS, “DP Operations Guidance” to ensure that the most reliable DP
system configuration is used during critical activities. Develop and utilize a CAMO for any
activity you or your lessee identifies as critical. When developing a CAMO, consider requiring
open bus operation during critical activities to prevent a worst case failure with a potential for
zero thrust in excess of your drift off time to the Point of Disconnect (See MTS DP MODU
Operations Guidance Section 4.8 and Appendix C “Example of a CAMO”, “Power
Distribution”).
o It may be possible to make a common power system fully fault tolerant in respect of
single failure criteria for DP Class 2 and DP Class 3. However, in such designs fault
tolerance depends on a very comprehensive range of protective functions and on many
items of equipment being able to perform to capacity. Operating the power plant as
two or more independent power systems reduces dependence on protective functions
and vulnerability to hidden failures. It does not remove all common points between
redundant systems. The potential to lose one part of the system is higher but the
potential to lose the complete system is reduced (See MTS “DP Vessel Design
Philosophy Guidelines” Section 10.8).
disturbance. This testing should indicate how the system will react during a significant bus
disturbance such as a short circuit on the main switchboard. Where ride-through capability is
an essential part of the DP redundancy concept it should be proven by live short circuit and
ground fault testing per Section 9.2.5 of the MTS “DP Vessel Design Philosophy Guidelines”.
This testing should be incorporated into the vessel DP Proving Trial (5-year).
drives, motor controllers, etc.) as part of a preventative maintenance program to provide early
detection of faulty or loose connections.
This Safety Alert is provided for informational purposes and does not relieve any foreign or domestic
requirement. Developed by the Coast Guard Outer Continental Shelf National Center of Expertise.
For additional information contact Commander James Rocco: james.v.rocco@uscg.mil .
Distributed by the Office of Investigations and Casualty Analysis: http://Marineinvestigations.us
To subscribe:kenneth.w.olsen@uscg.mil
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